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Chief Justice Taft at the Helm
Alpheus Thomas Mason*
The importance of the Chief Justice of the United States in guiding
the work of the Supreme Court depends largely on the personality of
the man who holds the position. Professor Mason here provides an
intimate glimpse into the successes and failures of William Howard
Taft in his efforts to achieve unity and efficiency in the disposition of

cases before the Court.

The office of Chief Justice carries scant inherent powers. The Chief
Justice manages the docket, presents the cases in conference, and
guides the discussion. When in the majority, he assigns the writing
of opinions. Whatever influence he exerts in the exercise of these
prerogatives rests less on formal authority than on elusive personal
characteristics. Charles Evans Hughes, who had served as Associate
Justice from 1910 to 1916 and later had been able to observe Taft's
role in the Court over a period of seven years, considered the Chief
Justice "the most important judicial officer in the world." His actual
power, Hughes wrote in 1928, depended upon "the strength of his
character and the demonstration of his ability in the intimate relations
of the judges." The office affords "special opportunity for leadership."'
Certain Chief Justices, notably Harlan Fiske Stone, have held the
office in low esteem. Disparaging its duties as janitorial, as "never
enlarging the occupant's individual capacity for judicial work," he
complained that the office "absorbs time and energies I should like to
devote to what I consider more important things." 2 Not so with William Howard Taft. At the time of his appointment, it was confidently
predicted that certain personal qualifications alone would make him
an effective leader. "Mr. Taft has such tact and good humor," the
* McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
This article is a chapter from the author's forthcoming book, William Howard Taft:
Chief Justice, to be published in 1965 by Simon and Schuster.
1. HucmHs, THE Suprmu CouRT OF THE UNrrED STATES 56-58 (1928).
2. Letter From Harlan Fiske Stone to Irving Dilliard, June 7, 1941.
Papers, Library of Congress.
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New York Tribune editorialized, "and has so unconquerable a spirit of
fair play that he is greatly beloved of his fellow citizens." With Taft
as moderator it seemed improbable that the asperities formerly jarring
the "celestial chamber . . .will be softened and not quite so often
in the future will the Court divide 5 and 4."3 Drawing on nearly every
conceivable instrument and technique of command, Taft strove
earnestly to fulfill this prediction.
AimmisTnATvE DETAmL

"Perhaps the main question as to a C.J.," Holmes remarked as Taft's
first term began, "is his way of disposing of executive details." The
new Chief Justice seemed likely "to take them easily and get through
them without friction." 4 The minutiae Stone considered boring and
unimportant Taft tackled with great relish. Tasks large and small
confronted him. At the outset he had to wrestle with the seemingly
trivial job of making William Stansbury acting Clerk of the Court.
No statute authorized the appointment. Uncertain of his power, Taft
requested advice from his colleagues. Holmes said he did not know
enough to advise; Day said only he was for Stansbury.5 McKenna
bluntly told the Chief Justice what his office entailed. Other members
of the Court expected him "to attend to the executive business of the
Court and not bother them." Taft should realize "the Chief Justiceship
was an office distinct from that of the associates in executive control.
...All... the associates recognized.., that in judicial decisions all
were equal, but in management [he] must act and they would all stand
by if ever question was made."6 Reassured, Taft began reorganizing
his staff in line with his own personal needs. He was determined to
make his loyal secretary, W. W. Mischler, chief assistant, but his
predecessor's former law clerk had appropriated the title "Secretary
to the Chief Justice." "Now that is not his function," Taft insisted;
"by law, it is 'Law Clerk.'... Mischler is my Secretary and I intend
to appoint him and he will use the title."7 The necessary legislative
changes were made and "Misch" joined the Court's clerical force as
Taft's private secretary.
No detail calculated to enhance the Court's independence and
prestige was overlooked. Taft urged Congress to increase the compensation of the Clerk. In a lengthy letter to Representative Andrew
3. Quoted in Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REv. 883, 899-900
(1953); reprinted in FRAN'FuRmrE,

OF LAW AND MEN 111-38 (1956).

4. Letter From Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock, Oct. 2, 1921, II
HoLm.sr-PoLLocK LETmans 79 (1941).
5. Letter From WHT to Helen H. Taft, Aug. 3, 1921.
6. Ibid.
7. Letter From WHT to Gus Karger, July 17, 1921.
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J. Volstead he argued: ".... the Clerk's office is not supported in any
way by appropriation, but... by what comes in by services rendered,
from litigants and others having to do with the office." Though stressing the Clerk's expanding responsibilities, Taft's primary motive was to
enable the Court to "have large control in respect to the Clerk's office
and especially of that part of his expenditure which is made in the
confidential printing of opinions of the judges for circulation among
them for correction and amendment and approval before delivery."
With adequate salary the Court would be able to obtain clerks "who
are proof against not infrequent corrupting efforts to secure advance
information for sinister purpose."8
Taft came to the bench determined to make promptness "a model
for the courts of the country." "As many men strive for riches," the
ChristianScience Monitor noted, "Mr. Taft strove for a clear docket."9
Justice Holmes, continually setting records in disposing of cases, was
enthusiastic about the Chief's "way of conducting business." 10 Though
conferences for five or six hours at a stretch seemed "a pretty long
pull," the eighty-two-year-old Justice hailed Taft's "disinclination to
11
put cases over."
In questions likely to call out attack, Chief Justice White had been
a "great procrastinator." Determined to remedy this situation, the new
Chief Justice boldly took up the highly controversial Coronado case,
holding that labor unions, though unincorporated, are suable in the
federal courts. 12 The case had been argued October 15, 1920, and
restored to the docket for reargument January 3, 1922. Taft's opinion
for a unanimous Court came down June 5, 1922. "I determined to
have the thing decided and gotten out of the way," he told brother
13
Horace.
Never did Taft work harder to speed up the Court's business than
at the start of each term. Certain colleagues complained. "It has
been a mistake to press things so hard," Holmes cautioned. "It
wouldh't matter if we disposed of only twenty certioraries a week as
far as I can see." Even the young and vigorous Stone felt the Chief
Justice's pressure to clear the docket. The struggle to "keep up"
entailed strain. "But," the Chief Justice warned, "we are not resigning on that account and we have got to face the music and I don't
know anyone better able to do it than you are." 14
8. Letter From WHT to Andrew J. Volstead, March 1, 1922.
9. Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 5, 1930.
10. Letter From 0. W. Holmes to Harold Laski, Dec. 22, 1921, I HoLmEs-LAsKI
LErrEms 389-90 (1953).
11. Letter From Holmes to H. Laski, Oct. 22, 1922, id. at 457.
12. UMW v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U.S. 344 (1921).
13. Letter From WHT to Horace D. Taft, June 16, 1922.
14. Letter From WHT to H. F. Stone, Sept. 4, 1925.
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To accelerate the Court's business, Taft suggested the recess be
shortened. "We had seventeen weeks last year. I would like to cut
them down to twelve. I think we might sit a week or two later in
June."' 5 To Taft's dismay his colleagues, some "lazy," others "old,"
demurred. They enjoyed these long recesses. 6
A combination of factors sometimes frustrated the Chief Justice's
attempt to keep everyone abreast. Van Devanter's wife was ill,
delaying preparation of his opinions. The slowest member anyway,
he produced practically nothing. McReynolds, the Court's problem
child, was "always trying to escape work," unfailingly citing Sutherland's breakdown as an excuse for reducing the number of hearings.
Holmes's advanced years always made it "easy to argue on that ground
that we ought to cut down on the hearings." 1 As the term drew to a
close, the Chief Justice was often faced with "a cabal in the Court
to try to influence me to reduce work." 8 In 1928 his attempt to

prevent his colleagues from decreasing the number of weeks allotted
to hearings seemed hopeless. "I am afraid I could not carry a majority
of them for the full time allowed." 19
Yet, Taft's success was remarkable. At the end of the 1922 term
the Court "broke all records in the number of cases disposed of by
almost 100."20 Formerly the period between the filing of a suit and the
hearing of it had been approximately fifteen months. Now it was
reduced to a little less than a year. Success only spurred greater
determination "to keep up to the mark."2 ' Two years before he stepped
down from the center chair, Taft hailed the outcome as "far and away
the best showing the Court has made since before the Civil War";
and he added, "the present conditions are not comparable to those of
that time."2
Taft sought to speed up disposition of cases not only by appeals
to his colleagues, but also by revising the Court's rules. He was incensed by criminals who looked to the Supreme Court as a refuge
for delay. "We have determined to have no delays in criminal
cases due to our Court," he wrote. "We find that it has been too often
the case that a defendant convicted in a state court would get into
our Court by some hook or crook of constitutional suggestion, and
then that the case would be forgotten and not pressed to our attention
by the state officers." Lawyers appearing before Chief Justice White's
15. Letter From WHT to Louis D. Brandeis, July 2.5, 1922.
16. Letter From WHT to H. D. Taft, April 27, 1922.
17. Letter From WHT to Robert A. Taft, March 4, 1928.

18. ibid.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter

From WlT to R. A. Taft, April 15, 1928.
From William Stansbury to WHT, July 3,1923.
From WlT to Charles P. Taft II, March 18, 1923.
From WIlT to R. A. Taft, June 3, 1928.
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Court had been unable to tell when a particular case would come
up. Under pressure from Taft, the Court "adopted the rule of putting
these cases out for hearing just as soon as they are ready."23 Estimating
the amount of business that could be done in a week, he notified the
bar of the cases to be taken up. Lawyers would not be kept "hanging
24
around the Court to await the possibility of a run on the docket."
Chief Justice Taft was a zealous economizer. Early in his tenure
he cracked down on counsel who were slow to make an additional
deposit to cover estimated costs in cases subject to dismissal. The
Court rules required that this sum be paid within ninety days from
the date of docketing. Chief Justice White never strictly enforced
the requirement, because he "was opposed to drastic treatment of such
cases." 25 Taft was more rigid. He also led a successful effort to
cut the cost of printing the records. Solicitor General James M. Beck
complained that the Justice Department had been compelled to pass
a number of cases because the Court Clerk had insufficient funds to
print the government records.26 Instead of petitioning Congress for
more appropriations, Taft reduced printing costs by "eliminating the
unnecessary repetitions and a good deal of formal matter . . . not

essential to an understanding of the record."2 7 Printing fees were
cut from fifteen to ten cents. Three years later Taft, discovering that
the Court had made a $12,000 profit, advocated reducing printing
costs another 20 per cent-to eight cents. "I am itching," he told
Brandeis, "to reduce expenses to the litigants in our Court."m
Justice Brandeis, whose longhand draft opinions went directly to the
printer and passed through numerous revisions, misconstrued the
reasoning behind the economy drive. Aware that his own peculiar
methods swelled printing costs, the dissenter assured the Chief Justice
of his willingness to pay for corrected proofs running to "more than
the traffic will bear.... It would not, in the least, embarrass me to
pay," Brandeis insisted. "But it would embarrass me to feel that I
should curtail corrections." 29 Taft assured his colleague that he need
not be "troubled at all at the cost of your cancellations and changes
in your opinions. I have been talking the matter over with Van
Devanter, and I agree that of all things in our Court the most important thing is to get our opinions right ...

"

In words particularly

applicable to Brandeis, he continued:
23.
WHT
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, Nov. 28, 1926. See also Memorandum From
to Brethren, May 11, 1928.
Letter From WHT to H. D. Taft, Nov. 13, 1925.
Letter From W. Stansbury to WHT, Feb. 16, 1922.
Letter From James M. Beck to WHT, Sept. 25, 1923.
Letter From WHT to J. M. Beck, Sept. 25, 1923.
Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, Dec. 18, 1926.
Letter From Brandeis to WHT, Nov. 3, 1923.
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for some of us, especially those of us who go into subjects with some

elaboration, it is necessary that we should have our opinions set up before
we are able fully to determine the proper form to give them. ....I think
we would make a great mistake if we allowed the fear of expense to
interfere with the necessary procedure in making our opinions what we
30
wish them to be.

In the interest of efficiency the Chief Justice organized his associates
into committees. Brandeis's skill in financial matters recommended
him for the Committee on Accounts. Accounts reviewed in an
organized way would inform the auditors that their work was "subject
to our examination and... really examined.... We can sleep better
if these are matters of regular routine."31 Willis Van Devanter, "more
familiar with our rules than anyone on our bench,"3 2 headed the
Committee on Rules. Many problems arose out of the Act of February
13, 1925, limiting the Court's obligatory jurisdiction. Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Taft altered the rules to meet the new situations.
They also tried to "straighten out a good many inconsistencies and
absurdities that have been handed down since the beginning of the
Court."m Van Devanter carried the heaviest burden. He "drafted the
last set of rules himself," Taft commented gratefully in 1927, "and he
has had much to do with legislation that has enabled the Court to
reduce the arrears and to catch up with its docket."34
The Chief Justice's appointment of committees aroused little opposition. His power, however, was not absolute; it was subject to the
approval of his colleagues. In December 1927 the United States
circuit judge in Grand Rapids, Michigan, requested the Supreme
Court to take up the question of fees for the clerks of the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Taft replied that he would try to persuade the
Court to appoint a committee "so that you can keep that member
stirred up. My impression is that the best man to appoint for this
is Stone, because he does things." 35 A majority of the Justices decided
this was none of their business. Late in December, Taft informed
Judge Arthur C. Denison that "application should be made to the
36
Judiciary Committee of the Senate."
TEAMWORK

Taft brought to the Court a clear image of the Chief Justiceship30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, Nov. 4, 1923.
Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, March 12, 1923.
Letter From WHT to William Lyon Phelps, May 30, 1927.
Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, June 7, 1925.
Letter From WiT to W. L. Phelps, June 7, 1925.
Letter From WHT to Arthur C. Denison, Dec. 16, 1927.
Letter From WHT to A. C. Denison, Dec. 29, 1927.
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the office and its powers. Motivating his tenure was a passion for
"teamwork"; it alone would give "weight and solidarity" to judicial
decisions. "Massing the Court" was a consuming ambition. To
this end, he persuaded by example, frowned on dissents, exploited
personal courtesy and charm, maximized the assignment and reassignment powers, relied on the expertise of his associates.
Much depended "on the personal equation."3 7 Following Senate
confirmation, Taft received a note of congratulations from the Court
pessimist, James McReynolds. "There is a hard road ahead of us,
but under your wise leadership I like to hope that all will be well."n
Meetings were more pleasant, thanks not only to the lubricating
effects of Taft's personality but also to "the disappearance of men with
the habit of some of our older generation, that regarded a difference
of opinion as a cockfight and often left a good deal to be desired in
point of manners." 39 After the first conference it was apparent that
judicial business would be "turned off with less feeling of friction
and more rapidly . . . than with his predecessor."40 "We are very
happy with the present Chief," Holmes commented. "He is goodhumored, laughs readily, not quite rapidly enough, but keeping things
moving pleasantly."41 On the bench since 1902, Holmes reported
in 1925 that "never before . . .have we gotten along with so little
jangling and dissension."42 Taft echoed Holmes's friendliness. "In
many ways," the Chief Justice found him "the life of the Court: ...
it is a great comfort to have such a well of pure common law undefiled
immediately next [to] one so that one can drink and be sure one is
getting the pure article." 43 At long last Taft was in his element. "The
truth is," the Chief Justice wrote in 1925, "that in my present life I
don't remember that I ever was President."44
Taft had long harbored a grudge against Brandeis for his participation in the Ballinger case of 1910. To forestall possible discord, Taft
sent a cordial note touching a matter close to the Chief Justice's heart,
but not likely to stir disagreement. "I am glad to hear that you are
interested in readjusting the machinery of the Federal courts to better
the dispatch of business," the letter began.
37. Letter From John H. Clarke to W'HT, July 1, 1921.
38. Letter From James C. McReynolds to WHT, July 1921.
39. Letter From 0. W. Holmes to F. Pollock, Feb. 24, 1923, I1 HOLmES-POLLOGiC
LErns 114 (1941).

40. Letter From 0. W. Holmes to H. Laski, Oct. 9, 1921, I HoLAsS-LAsKr LErras
373 (1953).
41. Letter From 0. W. Holmes to F. Pollock, May 21, 1922, II HOLmES-POLLOCK
LarEas 96 (1941).
42. Letter From WHT to 1R. A. Taft, May 3, 1925.

43. Letter From WHT to Learned Hand, March 3, 1923.
44. Letter From WHT to W. K. Hutchinson, Dec. 29, 1925, II PmNGLE, LIFE AN
Tnris oF WInAm HowARD TAF-r 960 (1939).
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The mere increase of courts or judges will not sufflce. We must have
machinery of a quasi-executive character to mass our Judicial force where
the congestion is, or is likely to be. We must have teamwork and judges
must be under some sort of disciplinary obligation to go where they are
most needed. In this way, we shall get more effective work out of each
judge and he will be made conscious of observation by someone in authority
of the work he is doing....
It seems to me that through a committee of the Chief Justice and the
Senior Circuit Judges, a survey of the state of business in federal courts
could be made each year and plans adopted to send district judges from
one district to another in the same circuit and from one circuit to another,
so as to take up slack and utilize it where needed .... 45
Such friendly appeals, brother Horace predicted, would enable the

Chief justice to "take them into camp." "I expect to see you and
Brandeis hobnobbing together with the utmost good will .... The
truth is," Horace reflected, "that, while Brandeis has been on the
New Republic side, so to call it, in some cases, he has not put radical
stump speeches into his opinions or done anything else to make him
seem dangerous." 46 The hatchet had apparently been buried. Bubbling with enthusiasm, Taft reported that "Brandeis and I are on most
excellent terms and have some sympathetic views in reference to a
change in the relations of the Court to the Clerk as to financial
matters. He can not be any more cordial to me, than I am to him, so
that honors are easy."47 Reciprocating the Chief Justice's good will,
Brandeis reported that things were going "happily in the conference
room with Taft. The Judges go home less tired emotionally and less
weary physically than in White's day. When we differ we agree to
differ without any ill feeling. It's all very friendly."48
Brandeis's sophistication contributed greatly to harmony. He recognized that "the great difficulty of all group action... is when and
what concessions to make."49 Where fundamentals were not at stake,
he would make tactical concessions. During the first term Brandeis
submitted an opinion in a labor case which "very much pleased" the
Chief Justice, except for "the last 4 or 5 sentences in respect to the
growth of the Constitution. I object to those words," Taft informed
the man whose confirmation he had strongly opposed in 1916, "because
they are certain to be used to support views that I could not subscribe
to.. .. Now it is possible-I have felt that way myself sometimes45. Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, July 24, 1021. II
note 44, at 995.

46. Letter From H. D. Taft to WHT, July 6, 1921,

PmNGLE,

BicKEL,

op. cit. supra

THE UNPUnmSU'B-m

OPMNrONS OF MR. JusTscE BRANDEIs: THE SUP11EME COURT AT WoR xix-xx (1957).
47. Letter From WHT to H. D. Taft, July 6, 1921.

48. Manuscript of conversation in Library of Harvard Lav School, L. D. Brandeis
to Felix Frankfurter, BicKEL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 203.
49. Id. at 18.
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that these particular sentences constitute the feature of the opinion

you most like, and that you don't care to eliminate them. If not, I
can write a short concurring opinion, avoiding responsibility for those
words."50 Brandeis wrote back immediately: "I believe strongly in
the views expressed in the last five sentences; but I agree with you that
they are not necessary and I am perfectly willing to omit them." Concurring in the Chief Justice's drive for unanimity, he added: "I hope
you will be able to induce some of our brethren to join us."51
"I can't always dissent," Brandeis observed. "I sometimes endorse
an opinion with which I do not agree. I acquiesce." 52 An example
of cooperative acquiescence is Board of Trade of City of Chicago v.
Olsen.5 "You will recall," Brandeis wrote, "that I voted the other way
and the opinion has not removed any difficulties. Indeed I differ
widely from McReynolds concerning the functions and practice of
the Trade Court-as you know from the Gratz case.5 But I have
differed from the Court recently on three expressed dissents and concluded that in this case, I had better 'shut up.""5
By the beginning of Taft's second term, Justice Clarke believed
that Brandeis, fulfilling brother Horace's prediction, had been taken
"into camp." One of the reasons he gave Wilson for resigning was
that he and Brandeis "were agreeing less and less frequently in the
decision of cases involving . . . liberal principles." Remaining on
the Court meant "a futile struggle against increasing odds." Clarke
mentioned several cases, and there are several others he might have
cited. 55a What Clarke may or may not have known was that Brandeis,
in yielding to Taft, may have been playing a waiting game. Moved
no doubt by strategic considerations, Taft also made concessions. It
seems highly unlikely, as his letter to Wilson suggests, that Clarke
would have been willing to sacrifice principle on the altar of strategy,
whether the run be long or short. After listing certain cases in which
he and Brandeis had disagreed, Clarke concluded: "There is much
more, but this will suffice to show that in leaving the Court I did not
50. Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, March 30, 1922.
51. Letter From L. D. Brandeis to WHT, March 30, 1922.
52. Conversations, L. D. Brandeis to F. Frankfurter, BiCKEL, op. cit. supra note 46,
at 18.
53. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
54. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
55. Letter From L. D. Brandeis to WHT, Dec. 23, 1922.
55a. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). Clarke delivered
the opinion of the Court; Holmes and Brandeis dissented. Frey & Son v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921). Justice McReynolds, joined by Brandeis, delivered
the opinion of the Court; Justice Pitney, joined by Day and Clarke, dissented. American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). Chief
Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the Court; Brandeis concurred in the substance of
the opinion; Clarke dissented.
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withdraw any support from Judge Brandeis. One or the other of us
was shifting or had shifted his standards so that in critical or crucial
cases we were seldom in agreement." In Clarke's eyes, the Chief
Justice's ambition to "mass the Court" was extraordinarily successful.
Some of Brandeis's carefully prepared unpublished opinions are a
55 b

tribute to Taft.

Taft persuaded by example as well as by precept. During the
early part of his tenure especially, he displayed rare open-mindedness.
On one occasion the Chief Justice requested Brandeis to prepare a
memorandum on a complicated utility valuation case.5 6 During the
month devoted to it, some members became impatient. With Taft's
active support, the matter was held up until Brandeis was ready.
Then a whole day was set aside for discussion. "And," as Brandeis
described it, "it was a thorough discussion. Some didn't grasp the
facts and hadn't thoroughly mastered 57the memo, but it was a new
method in the consideration of issues."
"I am not an obstinate man," the Chief Justice told Holmes.' The
Coronado case had dramatically underscored the point. By a narrow
vote the White Court had decided that the union was liable under the
Sherman Act. Brandeis dissented and prepared an opinion. After
Taft became Chief Justice, the case was restored to the docket and
reargued. In conference the new Chief Justice presented the view
that the union, though unincorporated, was suable, that evidence indicated intent to restrain interstate commerce.5 9 Brandeis made it known
that he would dissent, having already written the opinion. Meanwhile, Taft encountered difficulty in writing an opinion. Cautiously,
Brandeis ventured: "I hesitate to [make] the few following suggestions.
Please feel entirely free to discard any or all of them." 60 Taft replied
the next day: "thank you for the suggestions you make, all of which
61
I shall adopt."
Brandeis's suggestions changed not only Taft's views but also those
of other members of the Court. At the conclusion of the 1921 term
the Chief Justice delivered a unanimous opinion holding that the
unions were not liable. 62 "They will take it from Taft but wouldn't
take it from me," Brandeis remarked wryly. "If it is good enough for
Taft, it is good enough for us, they say-and a natural sentiment."63
OPInIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957).
Southwestern Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
Brandeis-Frankfurter conversations, BxcxEL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 199.
Letter From WHT to 0. W. Holmes, March 30, 1922.
UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921).
Letter From L. D. Brandeis to WHT, May 28, 1922.
Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, May 29, 1922.
Brandeis-Frankfurter conversations, BxcanL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 97.

55b. See, BxcxrL, Tim UNPuBsIHE

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

ibid.
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An even more striking example of the Chief Justice's open-mindedness is Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton.6 Brandeis, joined by Clarke
and Pitney, had dissented from a cursory opinion by Justice McReynolds. After reargument, Taft reassigned the opinion to himself.
Again there were exchanges with Brandeis, leading to an unanimous
opinion delivered by the Chief Justice. Brandeis was proud of his
accomplishment. "That's my opinion," he commented. "Taft wrote it
on the basis of a memo in which I analyzed all the cases." 65
'Ve haven't had many dissents and we have been pretty nearly
solid in all cases,"66 the Chief Justice boasted in 1925. Unanimity was
achieved in the Coronado case, 67 and in Sonneborn, near unanimity
in the Child Labor Tax case, 69 all fraught with potential cleavages.
With Taft in the center chair, it seemed that the bitter divisions
which had characterized the White Court had been forever banished.
Even in dissents, the Chief Justice would sometimes set an example
of sweet reasonableness. "I have your dissenting opinion in Nos.
96,213 and 231," he wrote Brandeis, November 19, 1926, "and I think
you may add that I concur with you in the dissent. I was at first not
inclined to express my differing view, but as you have done so, I shall
70
go with you."
The Chief Justice's willingness to make concessions influenced the
entire Court. In the Chicago Drainage case 7' Justice Butler had
sought to modify Taft's broad construction of Congress's power to
regulate commerce. Coming around to Butler's view meant "a real
sacrifice of personal preference.... I was much opposed to striking
out of the opinion... the constitutional arguments," he told Butler,
because I think there is no doubt of their soundness, and that any other
result would shake the principles that have obtained since Marshall's day in
respect to the absolute control by Congress of interstate commerce .... I
have come to agree with you and Van that it will perhaps steady matters
not to dismiss the other view when doubt on the question created in this
argument might weaken the action of the Court by inviting Congressional
interference in order to relieve Chicago of the burden which she ought to
assume and meet. But it is the duty of us all to control our personal preferences to the main object of the Court, which is to do effective justice .... 72
64. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923).
65. Brandeis-Frankfurter conversations, BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 113.
66. Letter From WHT to Charles D. Hilles, June 9, 1925, MAsox, ThE SUPREmE
CoURT FRoMT = TO WAmunr 58 (1958).
67. UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921).
68. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923).
69. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1921).
70. Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, Nov. 19, 1926. The cases were Risty v.
Chicago, Minneapolis, & St. Paul Ry., 270 U.S. 378 (1925); Reading Co. v. Koons,
271 U.S. 58 (1925); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Murphy, 271 U.S. 642 (1925).
71. Burke v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 280 U.S. 585 (1924).
72. Letter From WHT to Pierce Butler, Jan. 7, 1929.
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An unwavering adherent of Taft's teamwork policy, Butler felt
that dissents were seldom justified. "They often do harm. For
myself I say lead us not into temptation."73 "You can always be sure
there will be no 'kicking' or hesitation or mental reservation on my
part," Butler assured the Chief Justice. "To me it is genuine pleasure
to help-if I can at all-to lessen your load and to make the road we
are traveling easy and pleasant."7 4
For a while, Harlan Stone shared the Chief Justice's passion for
harmony. "You know I am a team player and I should not have
kicked over the traces if you had not accepted any of my views....
I have only been trying to be helpful in this way which I believe
75
we should all be, in carrying on the difficult work of this Court."
Four years later, when Stone "kicked over the traces" and deserted
the team, Taft was distressed. "I have not been greatly impressed,"
76
he commented sadly, "with Stone's judgment of men or things."
Happy working relations were not accidental. Taft went to great
pains to establish esprit de corps. Seemingly trivial personal considerations-the sending of salmon to Justice Van Devanter,"7 the customary
8
ride he gave Holmes and Brandeis after the Saturday conference,1
the Christmas card that always went out to Justice McKenna-all such
personal attention to highly dissimilar human beings contributed
immeasurably to judicial teamwork. "I cannot tell you how your
tender note of sympathy touches my heart and comforts me," Justice
Clarke wrote in response to a letter of condolence when his sister
died.79 Genuine warmth pervades the letter sent justice Sutherland
in 1927 while the Judge was recovering from a breakdown: "We all
love you, George, and we would all regard it as the greatest loss to
the country to have you become discouraged over your work, and
we realize of what great importance it is to the country that you
should be restored to your working capacity."80 When Justice Holmes's
ninety-year-old wife died, Taft immediately made arrangements for
the funeral at Arlington Cemetery. Holmes was eternally grateful.
"How can one help loving a man with such a kind heart?" he wrote.81
Taft's capacity for bearing more than his fair share of the Court's
load re-enforced the magnetism of his personality. Reviewing cer73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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79.
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tioraris is the Chief Justice's primary responsibility. Though they were
eventually read by all the members, Taft had to prepare a memorandum
on each certiorari, stating the grounds for and against granting
82

it.

This function could not be delegated. Nor could he spare himself

in taking cases which generated little enthusiasm. "As Chief Justice,"
Stone recalled, Taft "was extremely generous in the assignment of
cases, often keeping for himself some of the least desirable ones in
order to treat his brethren fairly."83 Patent cases ranked high among
those to be shunned-"just like a dead pull," Taft described them.8
Patent cases were unappealing not only because the subject matter
was technical but also because of the voluminous records. Once he
84a
had plunged in, he usually found patent litigation to his liking.
But much spadework was necessary before he could grasp the issues
and master the vocabulary.8 In one case the record was so lengthy
that Taft had to spend three days reading it. In another it took an
entire week to write an opinion and even then he was not "entirely
87
satisfied with it."
Justice Clarke shared patent-case assignments. 88 His resignation
left only McKenna with a liking for them. By 1924, however, McKenna
could not "dispose of any case with a big record and complicated
facts or questions of law." "That," said Taft "throws the matter on
me."89 The Chief Justice's hope that Justice Sanford could be trained
to take over was disappointed. 90 Five years after Sanford's appointment Taft found himself loaded with a patent case so complicated
that his colleagues had taken the extraordinary step of not voting,
leaving its disposition wholly to the Chief Justice's discretion. "We
very rarely do such a thing as this in our Court," he explained, "but
the character of the case is such, with the length of the record, that it
is difficult to do otherwise. It is a very common thing in most Supreme
Courts to refer a case to one Judge and let him work it out. We
never, or certainly very rarely, do that."91
Because of his expertise in tax and rate litigation, Brandeis, as
opinion writer, was a special source of gratification. Taft turned to
82. Letter From Harry A. Hollzer, Feb. 14, 1928.
83. Letter From H. F. Stone to Marshall and Lauson Stone, Nov. 24, 1939, MASoN,
HALAN FxsxE STONE: Pnir.t oF =iE LAV 316 (1956).
84. Letter From WHT to H. D. Taft, Feb. 1, 1923.
84a. On the Sixth Circuit, Taft's patent opinions had been "generally accepted as
guides along the right road." Judge Arthur C. Denison, 285 U.S. xiii (1931).
85. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, March 25, 1926.
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87. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, Dec. 18, 1927.
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91. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, March 25, 1928.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

him with confidence. In the October, 1922 term, Brandeis wrestled
long and hard with a number of North Carolina Railroad Tax cases. 923
"I have tried to be gentle with you on account of them," Taft wrote.1
He had little choice, since no one else could be expected to do a
competent job. "Admirable, compact, forcible, and clear," Taft said
of the completed opinion. "It relieves me greatly to get rid of such
a case so satisfactorily."In May 1923 the Chief Justice was searching for a way to prevent
Hill v. Wallace from becoming "an uncomfortable precedent." At one
point the Court voted 5 to 4 against sustaining the Future Trading
Act as a regulation of interstate commerce. Later, by vote of 5 to 3,
justice Brandeis not voting, its validity was upheld. Brandeis suggested that the tax imposed under the act was "in effect a penalty,
because prohibitive and intended to stop. . .

."

Accepting the sug-

gestion, Taft wrote: "I shall try and add something to the opinion
of that sort so as to relieve us from embarrassment in the future."9
An "uncomfortable precedent" was finally avoided by invoking the
Child Labor Tax case, which, as Taft said, "completely covers this
case." The details of administration and the penalties imposed for
violations made it impossible "to escape the conviction . . . that it

was enacted for the purpose of regulating the conduct of boards of
trade through supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture and use
of an administrative tribunal consisting of that Secretary, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General." 96 Justice Brandeis
agreed that the Future Trading Act was unconstitutional for the
reasons assigned, but doubted whether the plaintiffs were in a position
to require the Court to pass on the constitutional issue.
Justice McReynolds claimed expert knowledge in admiralty law"the boss in Admiralty," Holmes called him, adding that "he has
carried through a series of decisions that I don't believe in at all."91
Taft recognized that McReynolds had "a great deal of experience in
admiralty law," but shared Holmes's skepticism. "I don't know how
deep it is. Perhaps he is more familiar with the constitutional features
of that branch of our jurisdiction than he is with the everyday details
and questions arising." 98 Despite Taft's misgivings, he tended to
assign cases of this genre to McReynolds.
Taft usually assigned land claim cases and Indian litigation to
92. Southern Ry. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519 (1923).
93. Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, Dec. 18, 1922.
94. BrcrEL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 204.
95. Letter From WHT to L. D. Brandeis, May 18, 1923.
96. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 (1922).
97. Letter From 0. W. Holmes to H. Laski, Feb. 22, 1929, II HoLMEs-LASKI
Lrmns 1035 (1953).
98. Letter From WiT to P. Butler, Dec. 5, 1922.
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the former Chief Justice of Wyoming, Willis Van Devanter. 9 Justice
Sutherland of Utah, well grounded in the complicated and technical
law involving boundary lines, water rights, and irrigation projects,
usually received the lion's share in these fields, especially if they came
from the Far West.100
Ability to gauge the capacities of his colleagues contributed greatly
to Taft's success in the assignment of opinions. Apart from his
"radical" views, Holmes was a source of much satisfaction. The old
man was really "a great feature" of the Court. 01' In the assignment
of opinions, however, Holmes's age made heavy demands on Taft's
customary tact. Once the Chief Justice telephoned to ask whether
"a case that he proposed to assign . . . would be too troublesome."
Considerably annoyed, Holmes commented: "if he spared me in that
way I ought to leave." 10 2 When Mrs. Holmes died, Taft assigned
Holmes a larger number of cases, hoping that the extra load would
help take his mind off her passing. Lighter assignments did, in fact,
go to Holmes, but Brandeis assured him that the "C.J." did not
give him easy ones in consideration of his age.'03 "Of course I
don't give him the cases that have very heavy records and that
require a great deal of work in reading them," Taft explained, "but
I give him important cases and try to give him cases that he likes." 10 4
The rapidity with which the eighty-five-year-old judge turned out
opinions caused continual wonder. "The only thing that tries him,"
the Chief Justice observed, "is not to be able to announce the
opinion assigned to him on one Saturday night on a week from the
following Monday." 0 5
Assignments to Holmes were simple compared with the difficulties
encountered with some others. McKenna was "so unsatisfactory
in his opinions that [Taft had] to select the simplest . . . in order
that he may not work damage to the Court." 1 6 Sutherland was a
"very strong man," but he had to drive himself unmercifully to get
his opinions out,10 7 thus preventing Taft from giving him any considerable number. In 1924 he felt constrained from pressing Pierce
Butler and Edward Sanford until they became accustomed to "quick
99. Letter From WHT to Joseph H. Jones, Feb. 4, 1926; Letter From WiT to
W. L. Phelps, May 30, 1927.
100. II PUNGLE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 1027.
101. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, May 3, 1925.
102. Letter From 0. W. Holmes to H. Lasld, Dec. 17, 1925, I HorMs-LAsKl
Lrmis 806 (1953).
103. Letter From Holmes to Laski, April 25, 1927. Id. at 938.
104. Letter From WHT to Rl. A. Taft, May 3, 1925.
105. Ibid.
106. Letter From WHT to Helen H. Taft, April 28, 1924.
107. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, May 3, 1925.
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disposition" of their assigned cases. 108
Van Devanter presented a unique problem. Though the "strongest
man on the Court" and indispensable in conference, the Associate
Justice was "opinion-shy." He was, moreover, a perfectionist, "never
content to let an opinion go until he has polished it and worked on
it until it is a gem. But he is only able to get out a few opinions
during the year on that account. " 109 The Chief Justice took every
possible step to relieve him.110 Once when Van Devanter, near collapse due to his backlog of cases, posed "a nerve straining situation,"
the Chief Justice told brother Horace: ".... we have all got to unite
to help him out.""' The extra load usually fell on Taft himself.
During the eight full terms of the Taft regime, Van Devanter wrote
a total of only ninety-one opinions for the Court compared with
n
Taft's two hundred and forty-nine.l la
Physical breakdowns often required the Chief justice to reassign
opinions, a task calling for the utmost tact. Sanford, though often
lagging behind, created no trouble. Van Devanter, on 2 the other
hand, became "very sensitive, cross and unreasonable.""
He does not write [Taft explained] and yet he hates to have any comment
made or action taken in respect to the matter. I turned over two of his

cases to Brandeis but B. though[t] Van would cherish resentment against
him. So I had to take Van's cases myself and turn over some of mine to
Brandeis. I told Brandeis that the experiences11 of
a Chief justice were those
3
of an impresario with his company of artists.

Van Devanter was also upset by the reassignment of Fiske v.
Kansas" 4 to Sanford. The shift seemed reasonable, since Sanford
was at work on a number of opinions in other syndicalism cases. It
would have been an easy matter to take over the Kansas case." 5
Yet Van Devanter voiced strong protest, insisting that Sanford had
shown "some weakness on the subject." Reassignment should be
delayed, he thought, until Sanford had written opinions in similar
6
cases already assigned him."
Taft himself was well aware of those among "his company of
artists" who might show "some weakness." Reassignment did not
correspond to a game of chance, nor did it always mean a second
108.
109.
110.
111.
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opportunity to tighten the bonds of judicial friendship. Although
necessitated by uncontrollable factors, reassignment afforded Taft
another opportunity to promote what he deemed the Court's best
interests. In the summer of 1926 Taft concluded that it was beyond
his strength to consider the long, heavy Chemical Foundationcase. 17
He selected Pierce Butler to take it. "Pierce is young and strong,"
the Chief Justice explained, "able and willing, and I thought I would
trespass on him." But there was a more compelling reason. "He is
the only one to whom I can properly give it. He was appointed by
Harding and not by Wilson, and I rather think we ought to have
somebody other than an appointee of Wilson to consider and decide
the case."" 8 Safe and sound Justice Butler, not the less dependable
Brandeis, got the reassignment. In another instance Taft reassigned
two cases from Van Devanter to Holmes, who had originally voted
with the majority in both cases.119 Much to the Chief Justice's surprise, Holmes returned both cases, stating that he could not write
the opinions. "In other words," Taft told Butler, "I think he is
going to vote the other way. As a consequence,
I shall have to
120
assign it to a more solid person, and you are it."
When the need for reassignments arose, Taft often found he had
a narrow choice of potential assignees. In the spring of 1929 he was
casting about for work horses to take on extra cases. To his chagrin
he discovered that Brandeis was busy filing a great dissenting opinion
in an interstate commerce case,121 running forty-five pages, compared
with the majority opinion of only eight. Patience tried, the Chief
Justice noted that this had delayed "getting rid of 5 cases that he
had assigned to him, but now that he has got rid of this, I hope he
may get through . . . so that he can leave a clean list." 2 2 At least
one goal-a clear docket, for which Taft vigorously employed his
assignment power-would be reached.
Near the end the Chief Justice was forced to relieve himself of
burdens he knew were his. Shortly before he resigned, he turned
over to Sanford a patent case. "I thought I ought to take it myself;
but the truth is that I have been23 sick for nearly a month and I
haven't been able to do any work."
Illness was not the only cause for reshuffling. If the judge to
whom an opinion had been initially assigned failed to enlist the
117. Letter From WHT to W. Van Devanter, July 9, 1926.
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largest possible support, Taft reserved the right to reassign it. In 1924
McReynolds had been assigned an important case under the Transportation Act of 1920.124 Brandeis could not endorse McReynolds's
opinion because it would "bother us in the future."'2 Although Van
Devanter persuaded McReynolds to change it, the revisions still did
not satisfy Brandeis. Thereupon, "the Chief took over . . . and put
out what is now the Court's opinion."'l Holmes found Taft's revised
opinion "so powerfully put" that he decided to change his vote and
join the majority.127 The Chief Justice was elated. Brandeis "came
over, saying that he too would shut his mouth." 128 "I suppressed
my dissent," Brandeis commented, "because after all, it's merely a
question of statutory construction and the worst things were removed by the Chief." 129 McReynolds was furious. Threatening to
retire, he vowed he would file his old opinion. The only effect was
a burst of laughter from Van Devanter.130 Within two days the
irascible Justice capitulated.' 3 ' Taft could barely restrain his sense
of triumph. "By writing it anew," he gloated, "I brought Brandeis
132
and Holmes over."
Taft used his assignment power to promote unanimous or nearunanimous opinions. Obsessed by fear of dissents, he especially
hated "an exactly divided Court" merely affirming the judgment
below 33 "The chief duty of a court of last resort," he wrote, "is not
to dispose of the case but to elaborate the principles, the importance
of which justify the bringing of the case here at all, to make the
discussion of those principles and the conclusion reached useful to
the country and to the Bar in clarifying doubtful questions of constitutional law and fundamental law."'3 To achieve this, the Chief
Justice must round up a convincing majority. In his early years Taft
was successful. Holmes and Brandeis's concurrence in the American
Steel Foundriescase 35 prompted Max Pamn to write: "I think it marks
the beginning of one of the greatest achievements to be had in the
Court under your leadership, and that is to win, and if possible
continue, unanimity in the Court." 13 The subsequent defection of
124.
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Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone marred the bright prospects envisioned
in 1921. With rare exceptions, a solid core held "steady in the boat."
Van Devanter and Butler were joined by that "real good fellow," 137
George Sutherland. For a while Taft could turn to Mahlon Pitney

for advice. 13 Justice McKenna, though "never . . . a very strong

Judge," 39 was "a good fellow and a good man, a man of high principles, somewhat narrow in view."140 With the help of these Associates,
Taft sought to achieve efficiency, unanimity, and harmonious relations.
OBSTACLES TO TEAMWOBK

Taft did not always succeed in his drive to "mass the Court."
Impaired health of some of his Associates and his own declining
physical strength constantly threw monkey wrenches in his path.
Personal idiosyncrasies also contributed to the growing disharmony,
the break finally taking the form of bitter dissents. During Tafts
last years at the helm these came fast and furious.
The physical deterioration of several colleagues continually
plagued the Taft Court. In 1922 Holmes was suffering from asthma
and the Chief Justice suspected it was of a "cardiac character." 141
Pitney, with a breakdown, and Day, suffering from the grippe, were
"weak members of the Court to whom [Taft could] not assign cases."
The Court's senior member, Joseph McKenna, posed the most delicate problem. Appointed by President McKinley, he was seventyeight years old and failing. "In case after case he will write an
opinion," Taft commented, "and bring it into conference, and it
will meet objection because he has missed a point in one case, or,
as in one instance, he wrote an opinion deciding the case one way
when there had been a unanimous vote the other, including his
own." 143 In 1924 the senile judge completely missed the main point
in the case assigned him. "It seems to me, with deference," Taft
wrote, "that you have not stated the real point of the case as agreed
upon in Conference." 144 Assisted by a statement from the Chief
Justice covering the central issue, McKenna tried again. "It seems
to me, with deference," the despairing Chief repeated, "that you
still miss the point in your opinion upon which the Conference determined that this case should turn."14
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As Senior Associate Justice, McKenna ran the Court during the
Chief Justice's absence. In May 1923 Taft was ill and missed a
conference. "I had all my cases prepared in typewriting," he explained
to former Justice Clarke, "and sent them to brother McKenna to use,
but he preferred not to read them at all, and the Conference did
not amount to much, so that we had to do most of it over again the
next week." 146 At the end of the term Taft was at his wit's end,
complaining to his daughter: "He [McKenna] is an Irishman .. .
and makes up his mind now on the impressionistic principle. He
147
is a Cubist on the bench, and Cubists are not safe on the bench."
Cubist McKenna had yet to perform the coup de grace, circulating
an opinion which left the Chief justice in doubt as to its identity.
McKenna's 'language is as fog," the baffled Chief commented. "He
does not know what he means himself. Certainly no one else does.
I try to give him the easiest cases but nothing is too easy for him."' 48
McKenna interpreted polite criticisms as thinly veiled attempts to
force him off the bench. "He is exceedingly sensitive," the Chief
Justice noted, "and loses his temper and at times creates little scenes
in the Conference." 149 In the final conference, June 1924, "McKenna,
just in order to show that there was life left in him, printed a dissenting opinion in which he differed from the entire Court and made a
lot of remarks that seemed to me to be quite inapt and almost
ridiculous."
The situation was critical, for, as Taft said, "McKenna's vote
may change the judgment of the Court on important issues, and it is
too bad to have a man like that decide when he is not able to grasp
the point, or give a wise and deliberate consideration of it."1 0 "I
don't know exactly what we are going to do."151 A partial solution
was found November 10, 1924, when, after a meeting at Taft's house,
it was agreed not to decide cases in which McKenna's vote was
crucial.
The long-run cure was to persuade McKenna to resign, but this
was much easier said than done. McKenna's firm conviction that
"when a man retires, he disappears and nobody cares for him," made
him balk.152 By the end of 1923 Taft's patience had worn thin. "If
he [McKenna] doesn't show some intention of withdrawing," Taft
146. Letter From WHT to J. H. Clarke, May 3, 1923.
147. Letter From WHT to Helen Taft Manning, June 11, 192,3, II PRNCLE, Op. cit.
supra note 44, at 969.
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wrote brother Horace early in the 1923 term, "we may before the end
of the year have to adopt some united action in bringing to bear
influence upon him. Of course that will fall on me as the spokesman,
and is not a pleasant duty to look forward to, because I shall never
be forgiven." 153 In the spring of 1924 the Chief Justice made an
unsuccessful attempt to persuade McKenna to retire. Holmes refused
to give his assent, disliking, Taft explained, "to agree tho' he agrees
it ought to be done." Older than McKenna, Holmes might have
suspected that once his junior colleague retired, the next move might
well be aimed at him. Taft thought Brandeis refused "because ...
1 54
he would like to have a Democratic President appoint."
Taft pushed on. He and Van Devanter consulted McKenna's
physician, who confirmed the judge's incompetence. The Associates
finally authorized the Chief Justice to confer with the ailing Justice.
Despite Taft's extremely tactful approach, McKenna refused to cooperate, but he finally agreed that the Court's opinion must control.
Taft "told him how deeply regretful all the members of the Court
were, how deeply they loved him, how chivalrous they found him,
how tender of the feelings of others he always was, and how peculiarly
trying it was, therefore, to act in the present instance from a personal
standpoint."1 55 Painful duty disposed of, a farewell ceremony was
arranged at the final Court session, and, as Taft said, "it was really
quite impressive. " 156
Another major obstacle to judicial teamwork was James C. McReynolds. Taft had never held the former Attorney General in high
regard. Describing President Wilson's appointee as "too stiff-necked
and too rambunctious," he predicted McReynolds would be "a weak
man on the bench." 157 As a colleague, the Chief Justice complained
that "McReynolds tries my patience." 58 He was, Taft said, "the
greatest censor of the Court" and the most irresponsible.159 "In the
absence of McReynolds," the Chief Justice wrote in the spring of
1924, "everything went smoothly."
McReynolds was difficult, not because of his views, which usually
did not differ basically from Taft's, but because of personal shortcomings. Though an "able man," he was "selfish to the last degree,...
fuller of prejudice than any man I have ever known . . . one who
delights in making others uncomfortable. He has no sense of duty.'
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He is a continual grouch; and... really seems to have less of a loyal

160
spirit to the Court than anybody."
McReynolds's barbs, usually aimed at Brandeis and Clarke, occasionally hit the Chief Justice. "I do not like your opinion in
#206,"161 McReynolds commented bluntly. "I think ... you can put
the case in a much more condensed and lucid way. The opinion is
hard for me to follow and is almost sure to produce confusion and
add to our difficulty." "Of course," he added reassuringly, "I have no
purpose to make even a mild row in public." 162 McReynolds could
not always be counted on to hold his fire. Of his performance in the
Carroll case, Taft reported: "McReynolds delivered himself without
reference to his written opinion" in a grandstand play to the galleries.
Turning to the new member of the Court, Harlan Stone, Holmes
remarked "that there were some people
who could be most unman1 63
nerly in their dissenting opinions."
Strongly addicted to vacations, McReynolds took off more time
"than any of the rest of us." In 1929 he cavalierly asked the Chief
to announce the opinions assigned him, explaining that "an imperious
voice has called me out of town. I don't think my sudden illness will
prove fatal, but strange things some time happen around Thanksgiving.""4 Duck hunting season had opened and the judge was off
to Maryland's Eastern "sho"' to fire away. In 1925 the "imperious
voice" had called so suddenly that he had no opportunity to notify
the Chief Justice of his departure. Taft was infuriated; he had wanted
to deliver two important decisions, and McReynolds had made off
before handing in a dissent in one of them, thereby holding up the
Chiefs opinion 65 "He came back with few ducks," Taft reported
tartly, and "the weather was icy." 1
For McReynolds the Court's bete noire was fellow Democrat
Justice Brandeis. In 1922 Taft proposed that members of the Court
accompany him to Philadelphia on a ceremonial occasion. "As you
know," McReynolds responded, "I am not always to be found when
there is a Hebrew abroad. Therefore my 'inability' to attend must not
surprise you." 167 McReynolds even refused to sit next to Brandeis
for the Court photograph. "The difficulty is with me and me alone,"
McReynolds wrote the Chief Justice in 1924. "I have absolutely

160. Letter From WHT to Helen Taft Manning, June 11, 1923, Muxpiiy, In His
Own Image, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 166.
161. Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1921).
162. Letter From J. C. McReynolds to WHT, ca. 1922.
163. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, March 8, 1925.
164. Letter From J. C. McReynolds to WHT, Nov. 23, 1929.
165. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, Feb. 1, 199,5.
166. Letter From WHT to Helen H. Taft, Feb. 1, 1926.
167. Letter From J. C. McReynolds to WHT, ca. Feb., 1922.
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refused to go through the bore of picture-taking again until there is a
change in the Court and maybe not then." 168 The Chief Justice had
to capitulate; no photograph was taken in 1924.169
McReynolds's hates included Justice John H. Clarke. The Chief
Justice suggested this explanation: "McReynolds has a masterful,
domineering, inconsiderate and bitter nature. He had to do with
Clarke's selection as district judge and felt, therefore, that Clarke,
when he came into the Court, should follow him. And when Clarke,
yielding to his natural bent, went often with Brandeis, McReynolds
almost cut him." 17 Clarke once asked Taft to urge McReynolds to
modify some of his harsh language, explaining: "I never deign-or
dare-to make suggestions to McReynolds as to his opinions." Listing
his proposed changes, Clarke concluded: "There are others but these
are so glaring that they are respectfully submitted to the Head of the
House." 17' McReynolds's meanness emerged in all its dinginess when
he refused to sign the joint letter sent Justice Clarke on his resignation. The Chief Justice, thoroughly annoyed, commented: "This is
a fair sample of McReynolds's personal character and the difficulty
of getting along with him." 172 Taft let McReynolds's silence proclaim
its spiteful message.
Taft's own opinion of Justice Clarke was not unqualified. "Clarke
had certain predilections that injured much of his usefulness on the
Bench. There were certain cases which came to him which he
decided in advance. Even Holmes spoke to me of this."173 "He really
acted in the Court as if each case was something to vote on as he
would vote on it in the Senate or House, rather than to decide as a
judge." 174 Despite misgivings about his philosophy, Taft still considered Clarke a "good fellow." 17 5
Brandeis presented a somewhat different problem. Surface friendliness and a remarkable degree of give and take on both sides
obscured Taft's deep-seated distrust. When Brandeis strayed, the
Chief Justice tended to erupt, in later years with extreme vehemence.
Brandeis's appointment to the Court had been for the ex-President
"one
the deepest wounds that I have had as an American and17 a6
lover of
of the
Constitution and a believer in progressive conservatism."
168. Letter From J. C. McReynolds to WHT, ca. March, 1924.
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173. Ibid.
174. Letter From WHT to E. Root, Sept. 13, 1922.
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Taft retained an abiding suspicion. In 1924 there were widespread
rumors that the Justice might be named Robert La Follette's running
mate on the Progressive ticket. "I know enough about Brandeis,"
Taft commented to Max Pam, "to know that that [the Vice-Presidency] is the last position which he would accept, but his sympathies
may be with La Follette, though I should not think he would go so
with reference to the abolition of the power of
far as La Follette
77
the Court."'

Taft's suspicions deepened when Brandeis refused to join in pressing Congress for enactment of a bill enabling the Court to limit its
jurisdiction and thereby ease the pressure of increasingly heavy
dockets. By the late fall of 1924, a clear majority of the judges had
expressed their support. But Brandeis had "grave doubts whether
the simple expedient of expanding our discretionary jurisdiction is
the most effective or the safest method of securing the needed
relief." 178 Though he did not approve the bill, Brandeis agreed that
the Chief Justice had a mandate from the Court. "I am willing,"
Brandeis wrote, "that you should say that the Court approves the
bill-without stating whether or not individual members approve it.
For, in relation to proposed legislation directly affecting the Court,
the Chief Justice, when supported by a clear majority, should be
permitted to speak for it as a unit; and the difference of view among
" 9
the members should not be made a matter of public discussion. 17
But this was not what the Chief Justice wanted. He sent a copy
of Brandeis's reply to loyal teammate Willis Van Devanter with the
indignant comment: "Because Walsh [Senator Thomas J. Walsh of
Montana] is opposed to it, as he told me, because he [Brandeis]
talked with Walsh, and because he always wishes to appear on the
180
,off side and a champion of the offsiders, he declines to help us."
By mid-December 1924, the outlook for the bill had brightened and
Taft was less inclined to arraign the dissenter. "He tries hard to be
a good fellow," Taft commented magnanimously, "but he misses it
every little while."' 8 '
Brandeis missed it again when the Chief Justice sought support
for making the bankruptcy procedures in New York more efficient. A
majority of the district and circuit judges in New York approved,
but not Brandeis. "I am sorry to say," the Chief Justice wrote, "that,
what so often occurs in dealing with our reformer Brandeis, he
always finds some reason for interfering with the course necessary
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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to accomplish real reform. Brandeis contents himself with saying
that what we ought to do is to reform the whole educational system
in law." Lashing out at Brandeis's motives, Taft concluded: "The
truth is that when we make rules that interfere with the young Russian
Jews [who composed the bulk of the bankruptcy petitioners] . . .
we find him a real obstructionist." 18 2 Taft thought, apparently, that
Brandeis's action after 1925 was in violation of Canon 19 of the
code of judicial ethics drawn up by a committee headed by the

Chief Justice:
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort
should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and
the consequent influence of judicial decision. A judge should not yield to

pride of opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than that
of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in case of conscientious
difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should
be discouraged in courts of last resort.

Having returned to the "liberal principles" Clarke thought his colleague had abandoned in 1922, Brandeis incurred the Chief Justice's
vehement ill will.
Taft feared that Brandeis's diabolical influence engulfed Justice
Holmes. He was "so completely under the control of Brother
Brandeis that it gives to Brandeis two votes instead of one." Holmes
has "more interest in, and gives more attention to, his dissents than
he does to the opinions for the Court, which are very short, and
not very helpful."1 83 The Chief Justice suspected Holmes's advanced
years made "him a little more subordinate and yielding to Brandeis,
who is his constant companion, than he would have been in his
prime." 184 A "very poor constitutional lawyer," lacking "the experience
of affairs in government that would keep him straight on constitutional
questions," 85 Holmes's "unsound" constitutional views were due in
great part "to the influence which Brandeis has had on him."1 6 If the
Court had followed Holmes, "I don't think we would have had much
"1
of a Constitution to deal with. S7
Evidence of Brandeis's influence is scattered through the HolmesLaski correspondence: "unless I let Brandeis egg me on to write a
dissent in advance"; "on that day came down an opinion that stirred
the innards of Brandeis and me and he spurred me to write a dissent";
182. Letter From WHT to C. P. Taft II, Nov. 3, 1929.
183. Letter From WHT to H. L. Stimson, May 13, 1928, II PRINGLE, op. cit. supra
note 44, at 969-70.
184. Letter From WHT to Helen Taft Manning, June 11, 1923. Id. at 969.
185. Letter From WHT to C. P. Taft II, Mar. 7, 1926.
186. Letter From WHT to R.A. Taft, Mar. 7, 1926.
187. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft Mar. 4, 1928.
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"When I can get calm I am catspawed by Brandeis to do another
dissent on burning themes"; "Brandeis .

.

. reminded me of a case

argued last term in which he said I should have to write a dissent";
"but meantime a dissent that the ever active Brandeis put upon
my conscience waits untouched."187a

The troubles stirred up by Taft's recalcitrant colleagues were
accentuated by the Chief Justice's own physical disabilities. After
his heart attack in April, 1924, Taft's impaired physical vigor forced
him to curtail his working hours. The result was "a good deal of
difficulty in keeping up." As Chief Justice, he felt compelled to be
"a little ahead of all the rest."
I am conscious [he wrote his son Robert] that I am not doing the thorough
work I used to do in the first three years, but it seems impossible for me to
examine as minutely as I should the records in each case. The others
have an advantage of me in that they are able to examine certain cases
closely and then let the others go, because they are not subject to cross-

examination on any case; and they can merely vote, so that I find myself,
constantly exposed to the humiliation of not discovering things in cases,
especially in matters of jurisdiction wbich are very intricate and most
exasperating.'8

The Chief Justice's lack of sure command at the conference table
forced him to turn increasingly to Willis Van Devanter. The Montana
Justice exercised "a good deal more influence than any other member
of the Court, just because the members of the Court know his
qualities .... His experience, his judicial statesmanship, his sense of
proportion and his intimate familiarity with the precedents established
by the Court" made Van Devanter a tower of strength. 1 9 On him
fell the primary responsibility for "keeping the Court straight and
consistent with itself." Declared the grateful Chief Justice: "His
power of statement and his exactness and his immense memory for
our cases make him an antagonist in the Conference who generally

wins against opposition." 190 He was "the mainstay of the Court"-

"my Chancellor," Taft called him. Even if Van Devanter wrote no
opinions at all, "we could hardly get along without him," the Chief
Justice declared. 191
The honorific title "lord chancellor" 192 seemed apt for Van Devanter,
not only for the assistance he rendered in the conference but also
187a. KONEFSKY, Holmes and Brandeis, Companions in Dissent, 10
269, 270 (1957).
188. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, Jan. 25, 1925.
189. Letter From WHT to James Rowland Angell, Dec. 2, 1926.
190. Letter From W. L. Phelps, May 30, 1927.
191. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, Jan. 16, 1927.
192. FRANEinmTm, OF LAW m4D MEN 129 (1956).
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for the effective chain of command the Chief Justice was able to
establish through him. Time and again Van Devanter played reconnaissance scout: "Justice Brandeis just telephoned asking for a talk
this afternoon about the Keokuk Bridge tax case' 93 and of course I
told him to come along," Van Devanter wrote the Chief Justice.
With this conference in the offing, "there may be a good prospect of
putting the matter on its right foot." 94
Taft's memorandum opinions regularly went out to Van Devanter.
Sending his opinion in the historic Truax case,195 Taft wrote: "I have
not sent this to the whole Court because I want to have the benefit
of your suggestions and corrections before doing so." Taft told
Van Devanter to "cut and slash," because "I found on looking into
the case that it seemed necessary to take
up the due process feature
96
rather more than I had anticipated."
Forthright criticism from Van Devanter was not unusual. After
reading Taft's opinion in Wolff Packing Company v. Court of In-

dustrial Relations, 97 Van Devanter wrote: "Candidly, I think the
,opinion does not get off well or do what it is intended to do. It
halts a tendency for the moment, but does not conduct us into or
build a sound road for the future." Van Devanter, feeling the Court
was incapable of handling the case "at the end of what has been
rather a perplexing term," cautioned the Chief Justice: the case
presents a real opportunity, and the muddled state of pronouncements in its near vicinity emphasizes the need of a thoroughly considered and carefully prepared opinion. I almost feel like suggesting
that you carry the case over. Would it not be well for you to take
also the judgment of one or more among McReynolds, Sutherland and
Butler?"198 As in the Wolff Packing case, such effort sometimes resulted in unanimity.
After 1927, Van Devanter's health failed, and his effectiveness as
conference leader declined. This loss, combined with Taft's own
failing health, made the Chief Justice increasingly despondent. A
little more than a year before he died, Taft complained: "The work
of the Court is not so much in writing opinions as in getting ready
for Conferences [which] grows heavier and heavier. I feel tired over
it and suffer from a lack of quickness of comprehension, which has
not heretofore troubled me much. The truth is that my mind does
not work as well as it did, and I scatter.
"Still I must worry along
193.
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until I get to the end of my ten years, content to aid in the deliberations when there is a difference of opinion." 201 "There was," Justice
Stone recalled, "much more inclination to rush things through, especially if he thought he had the support of certain members of the
Court."2 0 '

When the Chief fell short of the goal, as he frequently did in his
latter years, he placed the blame on a hard core of "knockers." "Three
of the nine," he complained, "are pretty radical, and occasionally they
get some of the other brethren, which is disquieting."20 2 In 1922
dissenters were merely "disquieting"; by 1928 they had moved beyond
the pale of both rationality and patriotism. "The three dissenters act
on the principle that a decision of the whole Court by a majority
is not a decision at all, and therefore they are not bound by the
authority of the decision, which if followed out would leave the
dissenters to be the only constitutional lawbreakers in the country. 203
To the very end Taft could usually round up a safe majority on his
side, leaving the minority in the posture of irreconcilables. "I would
not think of opposing the views of my brethren," he commented
somewhat self-righteously in 1927, "if there was a majority against
my own."204 True to his word, Taft rarely dissented,2Ma and he
suppressed at least two hundred dissenting votes during his Chief
Justiceship. 204b Explaining his position to Justice Clarke, he observed:
"I don't approve of dissents generally, for I think in many cases
where I differ from the majority, it is more important to stand by the
Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain than to
have it settled either way."
Evenly divided situations sometimes required calculated manipulations. In the West Virginia gas case, 0 5 for example, Justice Day, who
voted with Taft and Van Devanter in the majority, was about to
retire. Realizing the case would have to be reargued, if not decided
200. Letter From WHT to R. A. Taft, Oct. 23, 1927, Murphy, Marshalling the
Court 29 U. Cr. L. REv. 640, 643.
201. Letter From H. F. Stone to John Bassett Moore, May 17, 1943, MASON,
HAwLN FisKE SroNE: PnLLAR

OF T=E LAW 790 (1956).
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of dissent had been established in the Sixth Circuit, where in eight years he wrote
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205. Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2-58 U.S.
622 (1921).

CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT

before the resignation took effect, the Chief Justice wrote Van
Devanter: "We ought to decide the West Virginia gas case before he
[Day] goes off, because we need his vote...., 2 o In the Prohibition
cases, the Chief Justice invariably encountered trouble. "It would
seem," Taft remarked, "as if more feeling could be engendered over
the Prohibition Act than almost any other subject that we have in
the Court unless it is the technical questions of jurisdiction."-2 0
Once opposed to Prohibition, Taft as Chief Justice favored strict
enforcement. Detesting the unavoidable dissension these cases
aroused, he complained: "There are certain members of our Court who
I dislike to say are becoming a bit raw in their opposition to the
Volstead Act. There is something about the issue that seems to
engender bitterness. 2 °8
In the October term of 1924, the prospect of unanimity in Prohibition cases was almost nil. Of the difficulties presented, often resulting
in close margins, sometimes five to four, Taft wrote: It is "a good
deal easier to write an opinion when the Court is all with you than
where the distinctions are narrow, the record is badly made and
some rather new principle is to be established against a vigorous
opposition."20 9 Taft hoped to bring Justice Butler over by use of
gentle persuasion. "I note what you say about Brother Butler," he
wrote Van Devanter, "and shall try to steer [him] away from the
suggestion that we are introducing any new law and new principle
of constitutional construction, but are only adapting old principles
and applying them to new conditions created by the change in
national policy which the 18th Amendment requires."210 Less than
a week later Justice Brandeis, usually with the drys, abandoned the
majority. He had gone up to Harvard where, according to the
disgusted Chief Justice, he "must have communed with Frankfurter
and that crowd, and he came back with a notice to me that he was
going to change his vote."2 1 ' Although Holmes, Van Devanter, Bran-

deis, and Sanford were usually "still steady in the boat,"212 the Chief
Justice's "dear friends" Pierce Butler and George Sutherland tended
to oppose him in Prohibition cases. Stone, a connoisseur of fine wines,
presented a puzzle. Said Taft: "Stone wobbles a good deal on the
Letter From WHT to W. Van Devanter, Aug. 19, 1922.
Letter From WHT to C. P. Taft II, Dec. 28, 1924.
Letter From WHT to H. D. Taft, Dec. 12, 1926.
Letter From WHT to C. P. Taft II, Dec. 22, 1924.
210. Letter From WHT to W. Van Devanter, Dec. 23, 1924, II PpanxGL, Op. cit. supra
note 44, at 984.
211. Letter From WHT to H. D. Taft, Dec. 26, 1924, Id. at 971.
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subject, and I don't quite see where he stands, and I am not quite
sure that he does."213
An entirely different situation arose in the historic Myers case 21 4 _
a "monument," Taft called it. Failure to win unanimity for the
sweeping dictum that the President's power to remove officials appointed by him is plenary stirred bitter feelings. After the conference,
Taft issued an invitation to those "whose votes can be counted on"
for a Sunday afternoon meeting at his house.215 The Chief Justice
invited Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, Sanford, and the new
judge, Stone. "I don't know how the other three [Brandeis, Holmes,
McReynolds] will stand," he explained to Sanford, "but I want to get
it [the opinion] into shape so that it will be ready for their careful
consideration."21 6 At this preliminary meeting, six judges agreed on
the conclusion. A majority assured, Taft thought it "well not to make
any concession but to take the position that we have already taken."217
For Taft, the Myers case was a test of loyalty to the American
system of government. A majority stood firmly with the Chief Justice,2 18 though Stone seemed "a little bit fuzzy and captious in respect
to form of statement, and [betrayed] in some degree a little of the
legal school master."2 19 Taft's attack on Brandeis bordered on the

irrational:
Brandeis puts himself where he naturally belongs. He is in favor evidently
of the group system. He is opposed to a strong Executive. He loves the
veto of the group upon effective legislation or effective administration. He
loves the kicker, and is therefore in sympathy with the power of the Senate

to prevent the Executive from removing obnoxious persons, because he
always sympathizes with the obnoxious person. His ideals do not include
effective and uniform administration unless he is the head. That of course
is the attitude of the socialist till he and his fellow socialists of small number
acquire absolute power, and then he believes in a unit administration with
220
a vengeance.

After receiving the dissenting opinions of Brandeis and McReynolds,
the Chief relented: "I am old enough to know that the best way to
get along with people is to restrain your impatience and consider that,
doubtless, you have your own peculiarities that try other people."2 21
Aware that the Chief Justice abhorred long opinions, especially long
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dissents, Brandeis offered to pay the cost of printing his dissent out
of his own pocket. "I think we can have too much economy in the
matter of perfecting opinions [for publication]," Taft replied. "The
appropriation for that purpose is large and ought to be."222 Still he
felt resentment. "I thought mine was pretty long," he wrote brother
Horace, "but his is 41 pages, with an enormous number of fine-print
"Brandeis can not
notes, and with citations without number."2
avoid writing an opinion in a way in which he wishes to spread himself, as if he were writing an article for the Harvard Law Review.
When that is not in his mind, he writes a very concise and a very
satisfactory opinion, but his dissents are of a different character." 224
Even the lapse of nearly a year failed to allay the bitterness
aroused by these strange bedfellows in dissent. "McReynolds and
Brandeis belong to a class of people that have no loyalty to the
court and sacrifice almost everything to the gratification of their own
publicity and wish to stir up dissatisfaction with the decision of the
Court, if they don't happen to agree with it."22 5 Taft's castigation of
McReynolds exceeded that against Brandeis: "The more agitation
against [the Court] growing out of any opinion of his, the better he
likes it, because it exalts in a way that tickles in him the spirit of
opposition. His exhibition in the Court room was such as to disgust
Hohnes."226
The Chief Justice grew more and more impatient with differences.
In Olmstead v. United States, 27 Brandeis, after agreeing to limit
discussion, explored the ethics of wiretapping. "Where we make a
limitation we ought to stick to it," Taft said, "and I think anyone
would have done so but the lawless member of our Court. Nevertheless, I think we might as well meet the issue as it is, and provide
hereafter for making people shinny on their own side."M Even
Butler refused to stay in line; but Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, not
Butler, infuriated the Chief Justice. "They went on general principles
completely unsustained by the great mass of precedent."229 Justice
Holmes wrote "the nastiest opinion in dissent."230 "Holmes has no
respect for Marshall, he exaggerates the power of Congress."' 1 That
222. Letter from WHT to L. D. Brandeis, Jan. 4, 1926.
223. Letter From WHT to H. D. Taft, Jan. 5, 1926.
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Holmes had abandoned ship at the crucial moment was even more
galling. "The truth is," Taft charged, "Holmes voted the other way
till Brandeis got after him and induced him to change on the ground
that a state law in Washington forbade wiretapping."2
An ardent supporter of the thousands of law-enforcement officers
responsible for the success of the National Prohibition Act, Taft saw
the automobile as a new and powerful weapon in the hands of criminals. Agents of the underworld had seized upon new inventions,
"and these idealist gentlemen urge a conclusion which facilitates the
crime by their use and furnishes immunity from conviction by seeking
to bring its use by government officers within the obstruction of the
bill of rights and the 4th Amendment."M The Court must follow
"the old-time common-law practice . .. that if evidence is pertinent
it is admissible however obtained."=4
Stressing civil liberties, Brandeis had written:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if
it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent, teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by
its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
5
resolutely set its face.P

"It is rather trying," Taft complained, "to have to be held up as

immoral by one who is full of tricks all the time.... But," the Chief
Justice added, "he can become full of eloquent denunciation without
great effort."21 Worse, Brandeis could obtain allies; he had kidnaped
Holmes right out from under Taft's nose and had corrupted Justice
Stone. Of the latter, the Chief Justice observed bitterly: "Stone has
become subservient to Holmes and Brandeis. I am very much disappointed in him; he hungers for the applause of the law-school
professors and the admirers of Holmes."237 Sharing Taft's wrath, Van
Devanter predicted: "Every communist in the country and every
sympathizer with communism naturally will be against the decision,
and so will those who call themselves reformers but in truth are
infected with communism."m
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Excepting Butler, the dissenters in Myers and Olmstead were so
hopeless that Taft could only roundly denounce them. In Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association of North
America,29 the line-up was marginal. Two of the four who voted
against Taft's majority in conference wavered. They must be brought
into line lest Brandeis's labor views gain the ascendancy. Taft had
never seen Brandeis "in such a state of rejoicing after getting Sanford
and Stone apparently into his army and into his plan of weakening
the Court by boring from within."20 Effort must be exerted to "convince Sanford that he is very much out of plumb with respect to the
Bedford Stone Company against the Stone Cutters' Union. . . . It
seems to me," Taft explained,
that it is impossible to follow the reasoning in the Loewe v. Lawler, the
Hitchman Coal case and the Duplex case, without reaching the conclusion
that the use of such a combination to interfere with interstate trade and
prevent interstate sales is an illegal restraint under the Anti-Trust law,
and if we so hold we will be doing exactly what the Court has done since
the questions have arisen, and that to take a different view is to side with
Justice Brandeis, who has been against the Court on every decision of the
Court on such issues.241
Sanford was apparently unconvinced.
Stone might be more cooperative. "The continuity and weight of
our opinions on important questions of law," Taft pleaded, "should
not be broken any more than we can help by dissents.... There are
some [presumably Holmes and Brandeis] who have deep convictions
on the subject of the law governing relations between employer and
employee. . . . It is to be expected that in their attitude of protest
in the past they should find distinctions enabling them to continue
their attitude in cases presenting what are substantially the same
2
issues." 4
In the campaign for Stone's vote, 4 3 McReynolds came to the
Chief's support. Bombarded, Stone promised to "go over the whole
matter afresh."2" He seemed inclined to yield: "I, of course, appreciate the importance of avoiding dissents which do not seem necessary.....
My vote should not be taken to have the finality which
perhaps it appears to have."245 Thus encouraged, the Chief Justice
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persisted. "I don't think we ought to let up in seeking to have them
take the proper view," he had told Sutherland. "I am inclined to
think that it is better not to have the case rushed through but to
give time enough to let us discuss with these people carefully what
the issues are-in other words, to let the matter grow cold and take
it up again."m Two months later, the case still under consideration,
the Chief Justice advised Sutherland, the majority's spokesman: "I
don't think you quite meet the second phase of Stone's difficulties....
I am anxious to meet what will trouble Stone, and I think, too, will
trouble Sanford." 247
Though Sanford and Stone concurred, Taft was far from satisfied.
"We have an important labor opinion to deliver which Sutherland
wrote, and in which Brandeis has written one of his meanest opinions,"
Taft commented in mid-April, 1927. "Holmes sides with him, and
while Sanford and Stone concur in our opinion, they do it grudgingly,
'
Stone with a kind of kickback that will make nobody happy."i 6
By 1927 Stone was definitely on the wrong team. In the same
month the Bedford case came down, he told the Chief Justice of
certain difficulties encountered in writing a memorandum opinion in
Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company v. Swope.249 An article
in the Yale Law Journal by Professor Edwin M. Borchard indicated
the desirability of reopening the issue in Liberty Warehouse v.
Grannis.no Without Stone's knowledge, Borchard himself had sent
the Court an apparently indiscreet letter urging such action. Suspecting a dark conspiracy, Taft told the former Columbia Law School
dean how "Borchard has roused the indignation of the members of
the Court at his method of attempting to induce the Court to
reconsider or rehear the issue in which he is so much interested."' 1
Belatedly aware of this unwitting coincidence, Stone tried to convince
the Chief Justice that his suggestion "was entirely on my own initiative
and for the reasons stated. It was not inspired by Borchard's letter,
as I did not receive it until the day after I had sent my letter to you."
Exhibiting independence Taft may not have suspected, Stone concluded: "I am more concerned with the thoroughness and scientific
quality of our decisions and opinions than I am with the lack of
propriety of others for whom we are not responsible." z21
As his sense of balance and fair play declined, Taft became ever
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more rigid in his determination to have everyone endorse the opinion
on his side. This effort had been frustrated, first by Clarke and
McReynolds; later by Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone. Nevertheless,
the Chief still hoped for harmony. On returning from his last summer vacation, he echoed the tolerance and optimism of early years:
"They are all in a good frame of mind, and I hope that we shall not
be very much disturbed by differences of opinion."253 By this time,
however, the gulf was too wide to be spanned by a bridge built of
tact, good humor, and the strategic application of pressure.
In December 1929 the Chief Justice was fatally stricken. Preoccupation with executive details, coupled with unwillingness to spare
himself, contributed to his physical breakdown. From 1921 to 1930
the Court delivered fifteen hundred and ninety-six opinions. Of these
Taft wrote two hundred and fifty-three for the Court, or one sixth
of the total.254 Whenever his Associates became incapacitated, he
felt obligated to assign himself a heavier load. In the fall of 1922 the
Court was "shot to pieces." Justice Day, on the eve of retirement,
had "been doing no work," Van Devanter had trouble with his eyes,
and McReynolds suffered from the gout. Pitney was "ill at home,"
never to return; Clarke, depreciating the Court's work, wanted to
quit.2- 5 "Somebody has to do the work," as the Chief justice said, so
he assigned to himself two or three opinions more than to his colleagues.2m From 1921 to 1928 he wrote an average of 30.25 opinions
7
per term, while his colleagues averaged only 20.25.25
In 1924 he was forced to halt this hard-driving pace. "The truth
is that I have attempted to do too much, and I have got to be more
moderate," he promised.2 8 This meant he was "not going to bother
about the cases of others of the judges who have not kept up with
their allotments." His resolution was more than justified: "I shall
have written, I think, quite my share of the cases and if others don't
keep up, I am not just now in a situation to join in relieving them."259
On this reduced schedule, Taft in 1924 wrote fewer opinions
than he had the previous year, but four more than any other
judge . 0 The next year he complained: "It doesn't seem to me
that I write as rapidly as I used to."261 But he could still say that
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"up to this time I have pulled my weight in the boat of the Court." 262
He did so, in part, by assigning himself difficult cases. In early
January he had chosen to take "a very heavy case" which he thought
"appropriate that I should handle, although it contains an enormous
record." 263 Later that same year he again made a serious effort 2to
reduce his work load. He found the other judges "most considerate." 4
At the "earnest insistence of Mr. Justice Holmes," he was persuaded
to "cut down the distribution of certiorari from 50 to 30 a week." 265
Holmes had long advocated a less hectic pace, but it was not until
the Chief Justice himself felt it necessary to limit his activities that
other members of the Court could expect relief.
CamF ExEcuTVE As CHOF JUSTCE
For Taft a kind of futility had encumbered the position of President.26 The work was onerous and frustrating; on the Court it was
relatively easy, congenial, and rewarding. Things proceeded by
"systematic routine, and at the end of the day you have the satisfaction
of knowing that something tangible has been accomplished." 26 7 Taft
savored judicial leadership; for the most part he was free from the
endless wrangles inseparable from the Presidency.
The highest executive office, requiring swift ex parte decisions,
had been isolating and exhausting. On the bench, "you have the
assistance of your colleagues, who share in the responsibility of the
conclusions, the benefit of oral argument by counsel and of briefs
Work and responsisubmitted on both sides of the controversy."
fusion of reason
the
of
evidence,
The
weighing
bility were divided.
and authority, the deliberative character of the judicial function
were extremely satisfying. Steady and regular by nature, Taft strove
to make the judicial process more so. It allowed "control of your time
for careful study" and enabled one to "order life, if you do not overdo
the social part." It is "consistent with long life, hard as the work is." 26 9
Holmes believed that Taft had been "all the better Chief Justice for
having been President."270
In a speech prepared shortly after the death of Chief Justice White,
Taft expounded the requirements of the highest judicial office. "The
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Chief Justice is the head of the Court, and while his vote counts but
one in the nine, he is, if he be a man of strong and persuasive personality, abiding convictions, recognized learning and statesmanlike
foresight, expected to promote teamwork by the Court, so as to give
weight and solidarity to its opinions." A great Chief Justice, referring
to both Marshall and White, "was winning in his way, strong in his
responsibility for the Court, earnest in his desire to avoid divisions,
and highly skilled in reconciling difficulties in the minds of his
brethren." 71
As President, Taft possessed extensive power. But since he did
not know, as T.R. said, the "joys of leadership," the experience had
been frustrating. 2 2 "The Presidency," he said, "is the office that
attracts in the sense of power one is supposed to exercise, and there
are those who greatly enjoy its constant exercise."2 3 Taft was not
among them. As Chief Justice, he wielded the kind of authority he
thoroughly enjoyed. To realize it in full measure required definite
goals and qualifications. Success demanded "leadership in the Conferences, in the statement of the cases, and especially with respect to
applications for certiorari."2 4 It meant ability, through sheer force
of personality, to "mass" the Court. "John Jay did not think much
of the power of the Court," Taft recalled, "and so declined to exercise
it; but times have changed."2 75 Justice Clarke's voluntary relinquishment of judicial power was puzzling. "You are 65 and leaving the
bench," the Chief Justice commented. "I am 65 and have just begun.
Perhaps it would have been better for me never to have come on to
the Court, but I could not resist an itching for the only public service
I love. Few men have laid down power as you are doing." 6
Taft had brought to the Court a truly magisterial conception of
the office and powers of the Chief Justice. Under him the incumbent
was more than merely primus inter pares. Certain control was exercised not only over his colleagues but also over the entire third branch
of government. Thanks to his effort, the formal powers of the Chief
Justiceship were augmented. Nor was this all. No technical canon of
judicial propriety prevented him from using his wide-ranging informal
powers in what he considered the right direction.277 Enamored of
"the executive principle," the need for "teamwork," a policy of "no
dissent unless absolutely necessary," he set out to maximize the
limited powers of the Chief Justice in a way that contrasts sharply
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with his failure to exercise the actual powers of the Chief Executive.
Although he had viewed presidential power narrowly, as being circumscribed by specific grants in the Constitution, he saw the Chief
Justiceship in terms analogous to John Locke's "prerogative" theory
of executive power. The President, Taft had written in 1916, has
"no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because it
seems to him to be in the public interest." 278 As Chief Justice, he
tried to endow the office with executive prerogatives he had abjured
as President.
Taft did not sit with the Court after January 6, 1930. His resignation on February 3 evoked from his colleagues a heart-warming appraisal, stressing the qualities that had made his years at the helm
significant.
We call you Chief Justice still, for we can not quickly give up the title by
which we have known you for all these later years and which you have
made so dear to us. We can not let you leave us without trying to tell you
how dear you have made it. You came to us from achievements in other

fields, and with the prestige of the illustrious place that you lately had held,
and you showed in a new form your voluminous capacity for work and for

getting work done, your humor that smoothed the rough places, your golden
heart that has brought you love from every side, and, most of all, from
your brethren whose tasks you have made happy and light .... 279
278. TAFT, OUR CnI MAGISTRATE
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